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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to the proceedings below are identified in the caption on appeal. The trial
Court signed an order of dismissal on July 11, 1995, dismissing defendant Red's Lounge from
this case. (R. 179-181) Plaintiff/appellant has not appealed that ruling.
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iii

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(j), as
amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:

ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court correctly determined that USPCI did not
have any duty to restrain David W. Martinez, or otherwise prevent him from leaving USPCI's
premises.
This issue was raised in USPCI's motion for summary judgment and supporting
memoranda (R. 190-99), and McNicol's memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 20006).

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW:

The district court's order granting

summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.. 901 P.2d
1013, 1014 (Utah 1995).

ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the district court correctly determined that USPCI did not
breach any duty to restrain David W. Martinez, or otherwise prevent him from leaving
USPCI's premises.
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This issue was raised in defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting
memoranda (R. 190-99), and plaintiff s memorandum in opposition to the motion (R. 200-06).

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW:

The district court's order granting

summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d
1013, 1014 (Utah 1995).

ISSUE NO, 3: Whether USPCI was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that
any alleged act or omission of USPCI was not the proximate cause of the accident.
This issue was raised by inference in defendant's motion for summary judgment and
supporting memoranda (R. 190-99), plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the motion (R.
200-06), and defendant's reply to plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to the motion (R.
207-210). This issue was also raised at oral arguments, although those arguments were not
transcribed.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW:

Although the district court did not

specifically rule on this issue, this Court may affirm summary judgment upon any ground
raised below. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1012 n. 22 (Utah 1994).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a personal injury and wrongful death action. The plaintiff/appellant Betty
McNicol ("Mrs. McNicor or "plaintiff) was injured and her husband, James McNicol, ("Mr.
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McNicol") was killed in an automobile accident involving automobiles driven by Mr. McNicol
and David Martinez ("Mr. Martinez"). (R. 1-4). On August 16, 1994, Mrs. McNicol brought
suit against USPCI for failure to prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises. (R.
1-4).
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff filed a complaint on or about August 16, 1994, against defendants USPCI and
Red's Lounge. (R. 1-4). Plaintiff stipulated to an order dismissing defendant Red's Lounge
from the lawsuit and the trial court signed the order on July 11, 1995. (R. 179-81).
Defendant USPCI moved for summary judgment on October 16, 1995. (R. 190-91). Oral
argument was heard by the trial court on December 11, 1995. (R. 220). The trial court
granted defendant USPCI's motion on March 6, 1996. (R. 223). Plaintiff took this appeal
on May 1, 1996, from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant USPCI. (R.
230-31, 234-35).
Disposition at Trial Court
The trial court granted USPCI's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
USPCI did not have and did not breach any duty to restrain, prevent, retain or otherwise
control the conduct of Mr. Martinez. (R. 230-31; Appendix A).
Statement of the Facts Relevant
to the Issues Presented for Review
Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiffs claims, the relevant facts of the case
are as follows:
1.

At about 5:20 p.m. on May 11, 1994, Mr. Martinez left his Tooele home in his

pickup to go to work. (R. 146, 199).
3

2.

Mr. Martinez had to drive about an hour and one-half, and approximately 85

miles east, to get to his work at the USPCI plant at Clive, Utah. (R. 146, 199).
3.

At about 7:00 p.m. on May 11, 1994, USPCI's security guards, Ted

Housekeeper, and Eddie Hendrix, observed Mr. Martinez drive his pickup slowly, park in the
parking lot, walk to the security office in an uncoordinated manner, and sign a log in the
lobby. (R. 199, 259-60, 299-300).
4.

Because of Mr. Martinez' slurred speech and problem signing the log, Mr.

Housekeeper declined to issue any safety equipment which Mr. Martinez needed in order to
enter the plant and commence work. (R. 198, 298-99).
5.

Mr. Housekeeper requested that Mr. Martinez wait in the entry area for

"Resource" (a supervisor) from USPCI to come. (R. 198, 298).
6.

Mr. Housekeeper paged for USPCI night supervisor Richard Brown to come

to the security office. (R. 198, 293, 298).
7.

Thereafter, Mr. Housekeeper observed that Mr. Martinez had gone to the

restroom in the waiting area, where Mr. Housekeeper heard Mr. Martinez vomiting. (R. 198,
298).
8.

A few minutes later, Mr. Martinez was observed drinking some water in the

security area and asking where Resource was. (R. 198, 295-96).
9.

At that time, Mr. Martinez advised Mr. Housekeeper: "I don't blame you.

You're just doing your job." (R. 198, 295).
10.

Mr. Hendrix observed Mr. Martinez going into the bathroom. (R. 198, 254-55,

295).
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11.

Mr. Hendrix then went outside to monitor vehicle traffic through the gate. (R.

198, 254-56).
12.

While Mr. Housekeeper was on the phone, and while Mr. Hendrix was at the

gate, Mr. Housekeeper observed Mr. Martinez entering his pickup truck, which was located
in the parking lot some distance from and outside of the gate, and drive away speedily. (R.
198, 253-56, 294-95).
13.

At approximately 8:10 p.m., Mr. Martinez drove his pickup truck on a public

highway about sixty miles east of the USPCI plant, and just west of Grantsville, into a motor
vehicle operated by Mr. McNicol. Mr. McNicol and Mr. Martinez were both killed and Mrs.
McNicol was injured in the collision. (R. 192, 198).
Response to Particular Statements in McNicoPs Brief
Defendant USPCI has clarified a number of fact statements in plaintiffs brief in the
above text. However, a few phrases in plaintiffs "statement of the case" warrant specific
response. To the extent plaintiffs "Statement of the Case" is intended to be a statement of
undisputed facts, USPCI disagrees with plaintiffs statement that Mr. Martinez was "detained
by security guards" and that Mr. Martinez was "taken by the guards to a room to be held."
Defendant USPCI further disagrees with plaintiffs statement that a security guard failed to
alert the gate and that USPCI permitted Mr. Martinez to leave; which incorrectly infers that
Mr. Martinez passed through some sort of security gate in his car and that USPCI could have
stopped the vehicle. Plaintiff does not cite to the record in support of these characterizations
in her "statement of the case." Moreover, plaintiffs cites to certain deposition excerpts (in
her argument section) do not support these assertions.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Generally, a party does not have an affirmative duty to control the actions of a third
person. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was not acting in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident in question and therefore no vicarious liability may
be imposed upon defendant USPCI. The accident occurred sixty miles away from USPCI's
facility and did not involve the use of a USPCI vehicle. There is no special relationship
based on Mr. Martinez' employee status which would impose a duty on USPCI to restrain,
or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises. USPCI's actions in
dealing with Mr. Martinez did not create a duty to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez
from leaving USPCI's premises. Any holding that USPCI had a duty to restrain Mr. Martinez
under these circumstances would be an unwarranted expansion of traditional employer liability
law and would create a series of dilemmas to employers.
Any duty of USPCI to use reasonable care under the circumstances was not breached
by USPCI.
A jury could only speculate that any of USPCI's alleged acts or omissions were a
proximate cause of the accident.
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ARGUMENT
I.

USPCI HAD NO DUTY TO RESTRAIN MR. MARTINEZ, OR
OTHERWISE PREVENT HIM FROM LEAVING USPCFS
PREMISES.

This Court should affirm the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to
defendant USPCI because USPCI did not have a duty, or even the right, to prevent Martinez
from leaving. Ordinarily, a party does not have an affirmative duty to care for another. E.g.
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986). Moreover, "one has no duty
to look after the safety of another who has become voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited
his ability to protect himself." Id (quoting Benallv v. Robinson. 14 Utah 2d 6, 9, 376 P.2d
388, 390 (1962)).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will only impose a duty to control the actions
of third parties under very limited circumstances. A plaintiff must prove that a special
relationship exists which imposes an affirmative duty to control the conduct of third persons.
E.g. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). The Court has acknowledged the
"general applicability in Utah" of the special relation analysis described in Sections 314
through 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1159.

The

Restatement sets forth the general tort principle that one has no duty to control the conduct
of third persons. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965).
In the case at hand, the only exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to
protect against the acts of third parties which could conceivably apply to the case at hand are
the employee/employer exception found in Section 317 and the "taking charge" exception
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found in Section 319. The Utah Supreme Court stated that it does not view these categories
broadly. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993).
The Court has taken a "policy based approach" in determining whether a special
relationship is said to exist, and consequently whether a duty is owed. Id at 236. Moreover,
the Court carefully considers the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for
society. Id at 237. Consequently, the Court determines the existence of a duty by examining
"such factors as the identity and character of the actor, victim, and the victimizer, the
relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer, and the practical impact that finding
a special relationship would have." Id
A.

USPCI's status as Martinez' employer did not create a duty to
McNicol.

Plaintiff does not claim that Mr. Martinez was in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, even assuming Martinez was in the
course and scope of his employment before he left the premises, USPCI is not liable for Mr.
Martinez' actions after he left the premises. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1989) ("[Generally an employee is not in the scope of his employment
for purposes of third-party negligence claims when he is traveling to and from work.").
While it is true that courts have, in very limited circumstances, imposed liability on
an employer for the actions of an employee which occurred while the employee was outside
the scope of his employment, there is absolutely no question that this is not a viable theory
in this case. Restatement Section 317 provides, in relevant part:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an
8

unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if (a) the servant (i) is upon the
premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to
enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master . . . .
Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 (1965). It is undisputed that Mr. Martinez was not on
USPCI's premises at the time of the accident and was not driving a vehicle owned by USPCI
at the time of the accident. (R. 7, 192, 198). The Utah Supreme Court has refused to hold
employers liable under these circumstances. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 935 (citations omitted).
Moreover, courts from other states which have addressed facts similar to the case at
hand have routinely applied this rule to prevent plaintiffs from recovering against a drunk
driver's employer. Rg, Tallariti v. Kildare, 820 P.2d 952, 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding no duty where intoxicated employee left work and was miles away from job site at
time of accident); Purslev v. Ford Motor Co., 462 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(same).
B.

USPCI's actions in dealing with Martinez did not create a duty
to McNicol.

Plaintiff argues that USPCI took actions which required it to prevent Martinez from
leaving the USPCI facility.

However, USPCI did not take custody of Mr. Martinez or

otherwise assume the responsibility to prevent him from leaving the premises.
In Christensen v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984), deputies responded to a call
from a billiard hall reporting that a drunk was creating a disturbance.

The deputies

approached the man, who had been drinking, and requested that he walk his motorcycle from
the location. The man did as he was told, but was killed a few minutes later trying to make
a turn while driving the motorcycle. The complaint, filed by the personal representative of
decedent, alleged that the police had reason to believe that the decedent was drunk and should
9

have arrested him. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint and the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the decision.
In Christensen, the Court acknowledged that the deputies had a general duty to the
public but did not hold the deputies liable for failing to arrest the decedent. The case at hand
is less compelling than Christensen because USPCI did not owe a (statutory) general duty to
the public. Moreover, the Court indicated that a private citizen does not have a duty to arrest
- which is essentially what plaintiff is arguing. The fact that USPCI requested that Mr.
Martinez not enter his work station does not somehow create a duty to arrest Mr. Martinez
or to prevent him from leaving the premises, particularly where Mr. Martinez was cooperating
with security personnel.
In Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), a case discussed in
appellant's brief, a University of Utah student became disoriented after drinking alcohol and
subsequently suffered severe injuries when she fell off a cliff. Despite the fact that this was
a University sponsored trip, the plaintiff had a drinking-related incident on a previous trip,
the supervisor knew that most of the people were drinking that night, and the supervisor
himself had several beers, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision granting
summary judgment to the defendants. The court held that "[a] realistic assessment of the
nature of the relationship between the parties here precludes our finding that a special
relationship existed between the University and Beach or other adult students." Id. at 419.
The Court also stated:
Had she not been a college student, but an employee in industry, she could not
argue realistically that her employer would be responsible for compensating her
for injuries incurred by her voluntary intoxication if she violated state liquor
laws during her off hours while traveling on company business.
10

Id at 418 (emphasis added).
Section 319 of the Restatement provides that:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be
likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing
such harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965). The comment and illustrations to that section
address only situations where a dangerous person is in the custody of a hospital or sanitarium
due to a contagious disease or a mental illness manifested by violence. Pursley, 462 N.E.2d
at 250. In this case USPCI is not akin to a hospital or sanitarium which, under many
circumstances, may have a duty to physically confine persons and prevent them from leaving.
Plaintiff refers to Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993). Higgins
and other similar Utah cases, like the illustrations from the Restatement, involve situations
where the wrongdoer has either been arrested by police, imprisoned or committed. Higgins
dealt with a patient who had previously been committed and confined.
The Higgins Court stated that it would narrowly construe the Restatement sections that
impose special duties. Higgins 855 P.2d at 237. Conversely, plaintiff would have this Court
expand the purview of Section 319 so that employers dealing with a sick or intoxicated
employee are in the same position, for purposes of liability, as a prison or mental hospital.
Even the cases cited by plaintiff in her brief support a much narrower interpretation of the
duty to control. Benallv v. Robinson, 376 P.2d 388, 389-90 (Utah 1962) (imposing duty on
police officer only after plaintiff was in custody and after police officer exercised physical
control over plaintiff by putting his hands on him).
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Courts faced with facts similar to the case at hand have consistently refused to find a
duty on the part of defendant employers to take measures to protect the public at large from
the off duty torts of their employees. Kg, Williams v. USF&G, 854 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir.
1988) ("[A]n employer should not be held liable for failing to prevent an employee from .
. . departing from work in an automobile.11). In Cowin v. Huntington Hospital 496 N.Y.S.2d
203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), the defendant's employee reported for work in an intoxicated
condition and the employer, although aware that the employee was driving a car, sent the
employee home. IcL at 204. The employee later caused a car accident which injured the
plaintiff. The court refused to hold the employer liable based on the employer/employee
relationship, holding that driving to and from work is not within the scope of employment.
Id
The court also noted that the employee's actions in becoming intoxicated prior to
coming to work could in no way be viewed as being performed in furtherance of the
employer's requirements and that the employer did not participate in creating this condition.
In reference to plaintiffs argument that Restatement Section 319 imposed a duty, the court
held that "'taking charge' within the meaning of Section 319 requires a custodial relationship,
one in which the person charged with controlling the conduct of another voluntarily assumes
responsibility for that person." IdL at 205. The facts of the case at hand are even less
compelling than those in Cowin. In both cases the employee showed up to work in an
inebriated condition. However, in Cowin the employer knew the employee was drunk and
instructed him to leave, knowing that the employee had driven an automobile to work. In the
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case at hand, USPCI merely requested that Mr. Martinez not proceed to his work station,
which request was respected by Mr. Martinez.
In D-Amico v. Christie, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. 1987), an employer became aware that
an employee was inebriated and then fired the employee and ordered him off the work site.
Plaintiff was injured in a car accident with the inebriated employee. The court rejected
plaintiffs employer/employee liability theories on the basis that the injuries clearly occurred
outside the scope of employment. Id at 6-7. The court also rejected plaintiffs Restatement
Section 319 theory, noting that fl[t]he Restatement illustrations themselves — relating to
hospitals caring for contagious or violent patients — suggest a relationship more closely akin
to custody, as that section has, in fact, been applied by the lower courts." Id at 7.
In Tallariti v. Kildare, 820 P.2d 952 (Wash. App. 1991), employees of a subcontractor
on a construction site bought two kegs of beer after completing their work for the day and
then consumed the beer on the job site. One of the employees, who consumed eight cups of
beer, left the construction site in his truck and caused an accident with a vehicle driven by
the plaintiff. As in the case at hand, the accident occurred miles away from the job site. The
court held that "unless the employee is using a chattel of the master, an employer has a duty
to protect third persons only from acts of an employee that are committed while the employee
is on the employer's premises."

Id at 955 (emphasis in original) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 317(a)).
As in the case at hand, the plaintiff in Tallariti argued that it was defendant's failure
to control their employees on the job site that caused the injuries. Id Moreover, plaintiff
argued that OSHA regulations precluded employees from drinking alcohol on the job site.
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Nevertheless, the court held that the accident occurred miles away from the job site and thus
the employer owed no duty to the plaintiff.

Moreover, the court stated that the OSHA

regulations were intended to protect the employees — not the plaintiff who was a member of
the public driving an automobile on the highway. The court added, "courts have been loath
to impose a duty upon third persons for injuries caused by another's intoxication." Id.
Any ruling in favor of the plaintiff in this case would have far reaching and
undesirable policy implications. The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will take a policy
based approach in determining whether a duty is owed. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236. This
Court has held that it is "loath to recognize a duty that is realistically incapable of
performance or fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship." Id. at 237.
In addition to the factors discussed supra (i.e. the relationships between the actor, the victim,
and the victimizer), the Court will look at "the practical impact that finding a special
relationship would have." Id.
The practical impact of holding that USPCI owes a duty to plaintiff in this case would
be to seriously expand traditional principles of employer liability in the State of Utah. It is
undisputed that Mr. Martinez drank alcohol prior to his arrival at USPCI and that he was not
provided with any alcohol while at USPCL Under these circumstances, a tavern owner would
not be liable to plaintiff under Utah Dram Shop law. See Utah Code Ann. § 32A-l4-101
(1990) (limiting dram shop liability to those who give, sell, or provide liquor, or allow
consumption on the premises). In other words, if a person became drunk and afterwards
visited a tavern (but was not allowed to drink at the tavern), the tavern owner would not be
liable for preventing the patron from leaving. There are no persuasive arguments "why the
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duty owed by one who does not furnish alcohol should be greater than the duty owed by one
who does furnish it" Tallaritt 820 P.2d at 459.
Furthermore, if the Court holds that USPCI had a duty to plaintiff in this case, a host
of perplexing problems arise for employers in the State of Utah. For example, assume an
employee has complained to her employer that she is having health problems and the
employer directs or gives her permission to leave to see a doctor. If the employee is stricken
(due to illness) on the way to the doctor's office and as a result injures someone in a car
accident, is the employer now liable to the injured person on the theory that the employer
took charge or controlled the employee? Even if the employer had a duty to care for its
employee and to provide or allow for medical attention while on the job, can it really be
argued that the employer has a duty (let alone the right) to physically restrain the employee
or prevent her from leaving?
Suppose the employee tells the employer that she needs to go home immediately to
take some heart medication.

Assume that the employer is concerned with liability

implications of allowing the employee to leave and so the employer demands and/or forces
the employee to remain at the facility.

If medical help is slow in arriving, or if the

ambulance or doctor is delayed, and the employee is stricken or dies, has not the employer
exposed itself to a lawsuit for failure to allow the employee to leave and go take her
medicine? Furthermore, if an employer physically prevents an employee from leaving (i.e.
suspecting that the employee is intoxicated or under the influence of some drug), has not the
employer now set itself up for false imprisonment or other similar claims?
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The Utah Supreme court has refused to put employers in this kind of a position. In
State v. Ludlow, 503 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1972), an employer refused to bring a female
employee out of the factory so that a deputy sheriff could serve her with a small claims court
order. It was undisputed that the employer had no objection to the service during work
breaks but that he objected to service being done during working hours because his
manufacturing process was dangerous if work was impeded. The Court refused to compel
the employer to "produce" his employee under the self-determined approach chosen by the
process server. The Court held that "such a rule might subject an employer to a false arrest
confrontation if he dragged his employee through an assemblage of co-workers into the front
office to face not only a lawman's badge but humiliation arising by innuendo incident thereto
pointing to some kind of wrong-doing." Id at 1211. Similarly, this Court should decline to
impose a duty on employers to physically restrain, or otherwise prevent their employees from
leaving work - a duty which would be fundamentally at odds with the employer/employee
relationship.
H.

USPCI DID NOT BREACH ANY DUTY TO THE MCNICOLS

Even if USPCI did somehow owe a duty to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez
from leaving USPCI's premises, plaintiff has made no showing that USPCI's actions were
unreasonable.
In Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982), the defendant bowling alley was
sued for failure to protect a patron from the allegedly foreseeable assault of another patron.
Evidence was presented at trial that the bowling alley knew that tensions existed between
plaintiffs bowling group and the assaulting patron's bowling group. Moreover, plaintiff had
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complained of the other bowling group's unruly behavior just prior to the assault. However,
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision granting judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in favor of the defendant bowling alley. The Court held that "[i]t required
unreasonable speculation by the jury to conclude from a generalized animosity between two
leagues that [the bowling alley] should have had prescience of the attack which resulted." Id.
at 696.
Similarly, in the case at hand, it would require unreasonable speculation by a jury to
conclude that, because USPCI suspected Mr. Martinez was intoxicated, USPCI should have
known Mr. Martinez would try and leave the facility. The evidence is that Mr. Martinez was
cooperating with security personnel prior to leaving the premises.

(R. 198, 295).

Furthermore, when security personnel realized Mr. Martinez had left, Mr. Martinez was some
distance away from them and was entering his car. (R. 198, 253-56, 294-95). Under these
circumstances, the trial court correctly found that USPCI did not breach a duty to prevent Mr.
Martinez from leaving USPCI's premises.
III.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT USPCI'S ACTS WERE THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Even assuming that USPCI breached a duty to plaintiff, which USPCI strongly denies,
there is no evidence in the record that any act of USPCI was a proximate cause of the
accident. The plaintiff has the burden to show that USPCI's conduct was a substantial
causative factor that led to Mr. McNicol's death and Mrs. McNicol's injuries. Mitchell v.
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985). There is no evidence that the alleged acts
or omissions of USPCI proximately caused the accident in question.
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Mr. Martinez became intoxicated prior to arriving at USPCI and left USPCI of his own
volition. Any argument that USPCI should have acted differently, and that had it acted
differently the accident would not have occurred, is purely speculation. The Utah Supreme
Court has held that f,[w]hen the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim
fails as a matter of law." IcL (quoting Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah* 655
P.2d 680, 684 (Utah 1982). Plaintiff herself has never even offered a specific and practical
proposal as to what an employer should do with an inebriated employee. Therefore, this
Court should affirm the trial court's decision granting USPCFs motion for summary judgment
for failure to produce sufficient evidence that USPCFs alleged acts and omissions were the
proximate cause of the McNicols' injuries.
CONCLUSION
Existing case law and public policy concerns mandate that USPCI had no duty or right
to restrain or otherwise prevent Mr. Martinez from leaving the premises on the day of the
accident. Furthermore, there is no evidence that USPCI breached any duty to the McNicols
or that the alleged acts and omissions of USPCI were the proximate cause of the McNicols'
injuries.

For the foregoing reasons, USPCI respectfully requests that this Court affirm the

trial court's decision granting summary judgment to USPCI.
Dated this / ^

day of December, 1996.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Jay £/Jensen
Geoffrey C. Haslam
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
USPCI
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APPENDIX A:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

%m-2

Jay E. Jensen, #1676
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant USPCI
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone:
(801) 355-3431

F;; IH-S

FILED GV.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BETTY MCNICOL, individually and
as executor for the estate of
JAMES MCNICOL, SR.,

)
)
)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

i
i

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)

USPCI and RED'S LOUNGE,

)

Civil No. 940300040 WD
Judge L.A. Dever
Defendants,

)

The motion of the defendant USPCI for summary judgment on
plaintiff's

complaint

came on regularly

for hearing

before

the

Honorable L.A. Dever in the above-entitled court on December 4, 1995
at about 11:00 a.m.

The parties through their respective counsel

having submitted memoranda and having argued the matter fully,
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that defendant USPCI
did not have and did not breach any duty to restrain, prevent, retain
or otherwise control the conduct of David W. Martinez and therefore
grants defendant USPCI's motion for summary judgment and,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff take nothing
from defendant USPCI, that the action against defendant USPCI be
dismissed on the merits, a.nH thnh

f C - ^ f o n ^ n f - n^Pf=^^a^^oAr^-r ry£-j?Yi<*

1

of- iTamopi Mf?Nn <-n1 ; — S r . , i t s c o s t s - o f a o t i o n i n tha-fiiim o f
DATED t h i s J—

d a y of.Jfea?eh,

1996.

BY THE COURT:

p o t a b l e L.A.
D i s t r i c t Court

2

Dever
Judge
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